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As predicted, participants responded positively to conscious state attributions only for those 
entities that typically display the simple features identified in the AGENCY model (eyes, 
distinctive motion, interaction) and took longer to deny conscious states to those entities. 
 
1. The problem of other conscious minds  
 
We find it so natural to think that other people and animals are conscious that it is easy to 
overlook a deep puzzle: why do we think anything else is conscious?  Consciousness is widely 
regarded to be a paradigmatically private affair, something that could never be publicly 
observed.  So what prompts us to think that others have conscious minds at all?
1   
The fact that we are inclined to attribute conscious states to other creatures has long been 
recognized as puzzling by philosophers (Augustine, De Trinitate 8.6.9; Reid, 1969[1785]).  We 
can think of this puzzle as the descriptive problem of other conscious minds.
2  Philosophers have 
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this paper, we focus only on the cognitive process(es) underlying token 
attributions of conscious experience (e.g., pain) to different entities.  We are not here concerned 
with the folk’s metacognitive recognition that one’s attribution of (say) pain is an attribution of 
consciousness.  For one approach to answering the metacognitive question, see Sytsma and 
Machery (forthcoming). 
2 We focus on the problem of why we are inclined to attribute conscious states to others. This 
can be thought of as part of a broader problem, ‘the problem of other minds,’ which asks why we 
are inclined to attribute any mental states whatsoever to other beings.  But for philosophers like 
Augustine, Reid, and Mill, the problem of other conscious minds would have been a critical part 
of the broader problem of other minds.  3 
 
made various speculations about what leads us to think that others have conscious states.  J. S. 
Mill develops a version of the most famous answer to the puzzle: I come to believe in other 
minds by drawing an analogy with my own case.  He writes:  
[B]y what considerations am I led to believe, that there exist other sentient creatures; that 
the walking and speaking figures which I see and hear, have sensations and thoughts, or 
in other words, possess Minds?… I conclude that other human beings have feelings like 
me, because, first, they have bodies like me, which I know, in my own case, to be the 
antecedent condition of feelings; and because, secondly, they exhibit the acts, and other 
outward signs, which in my own case I know by experience to be caused by feelings 
(Mill, 1865).  
Mill’s statement suggests the following procedure, which involves analogical reasoning:  I know 
that my feelings come via my body, and I appreciate the analogy between my body and the 
bodies of others; I also know that certain behaviors of mine are caused by mental states; so when 
I see other analogous bodies exhibiting similar behaviors, I infer that their behaviors are also 
caused by mental states. It’s easy to see why this view has been historically attractive.  
Analogical reasoning provides a sensible and familiar explanation for our belief in other minds.  
Although the analogical theory has historical weight and a few contemporary advocates 
(e.g. Hill, 1984; Hyslop, 1995), the currently dominant view is that we believe in other conscious 
minds because it’s the best explanation for what we observe.  This approach has been developed 
in recent years by a number of people.  For instance, Robert Pargetter asks, ‘What is the nature 
of the inferences that we all so commonly, and rightly, make from certain behavioural evidence 
to the mental lives of other people?’  He suggests that ‘these inferences should best be viewed as 
being common scientific or hypothetic inferences, or arguments to the best explanation’ 4 
 
(Pargetter, 1984, 158).  The idea is that we come to believe in other conscious minds by using 
good inductive techniques – appealing to other conscious minds is the best explanation for the 
behavior we observe.
3  This basic approach has been widely adopted in recent philosophy. 
Indeed, it’s promoted in standard textbooks in the philosophy of mind (Churchland, 1988, 71-72; 
Graham, 1998, 57-63).
4  
            The philosophical appeals to analogy and best explanation are based on speculation and 
informal observation.  But over the last several decades there has been an impressive body of 
empirical work on how children and adults attribute mental states across a broad range of 
conditions (for reviews see e.g., Goldman, 2006; Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997; Nichols and Stich, 
2003; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990).  Some of the mental states that have been explored in this 
literature are, of course, conscious mental states (see e.g., Paul Harris, 1989).  This work has 
taught us a great deal, but very little of this work is focused directly on the traditional question, 
‘what leads us to think that particular individuals are bearers of conscious mental states?’.  That 
                                                 
3 It should be noted, though, that Inference to the Best Explanation and Analogy need not be seen 
as mutually exclusive competitors. One could in principle take a particular argument from 
analogy to be the best explanation for certain kinds of behavior.  In other words, one might 
reason along the following lines: ‘well, the best explanation for that person’s behavior, which is 
quite similar to my own, is that they are experiencing the same things as myself.’  
4 Despite the enthusiasm for the best explanation approach, a number of philosophers have 
worried that it is inadequate for capturing why we attribute consciousness to others. The worry is 
that, while it is easy enough to see why the best explanation for behavior would require 
attributing information-processing states to others, it’s much harder to see why the best 
explanation for behavior would require attributing conscious states (e.g. Melnyk, 1994). 5 
 
is, there is little work aimed at explaining what leads us to regard something as a candidate for 
having conscious states at all.    
            In addition to the intrinsic interest of the descriptive problem, solving the problem may 
also help us to evaluate whether the processes by which we gauge consciousness are in fact good 
processes. A familiar view in philosophy is that the way we in fact identify others as conscious 
is, in general, a rationally sound method (Mill, 1865; Pargetter, 1984).  That is, the path by which 
we identify others as conscious is, roughly, a rationally appropriate path.  However, it is an old 
and familiar philosophical worry that the basis for our thinking that others are conscious might 
be entirely spurious (e.g. Descartes, 1641/1986).  To know whether such a worry is misplaced 
presumably requires determining the actual basis on which we come to think of others as 
conscious.  
 
2. The problem of other minds in psychology  
 
The descriptive problem of other minds has a long history in philosophy.  Over the last twenty 
years, cognitive scientists have been intensively exploring how people attribute mental states to 
others (see e.g., Goldman, 2006; Nichols and Stich, 2003; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990). As 
noted above, little of this work in cognitive science is focused directly at our question of what 
leads people to attribute conscious states—like pain—to others.  However, there is one strand of 
work that provides a very promising framework.  This research focuses on what generates the 
tendency to think that a certain object has mental states at all.  
One of the earliest investigations on the topic is Heider and Simmel’s 1944 study on how 
adults describe an animation involving geometric objects moving about in distinctive ways.  6 
 
They found overwhelmingly that adults describe the animation by adverting to mental states.  
For example, at one point in the animation, the big triangle repeatedly bumps up against the 
inside edge of a rectangle, and nearly all subjects say that the triangle wants to get out of the box. 
More recent work shows that children respond in much the same way to these sorts of stimuli.  
Like the adults in Heider and Simmel’s study, when children are asked to describe what they 
saw, they advert to the goals, beliefs, and intentions of the triangles in a 2D animation (e.g. 
Bowler and Thommen, 2000; Abell et al., 2000; Dasser, 1989).  If you’ve watched one of these 
animations, the results will come as no surprise. It’s extremely natural to see these objects as 
having mental states because the motion trajectories of the triangles ‘push the right buttons’ to 
trigger mind attribution.
5  This becomes evident when one contrasts Heider-Simmel style 
animations with an animation of triangles moving about the surface in straight lines at constant 
speeds.  In that case, there is no inclination to start attributing mental states to the triangles. 
Motion alone is not sufficient. But it remains possible that relatively simple motion cues suffice 
for agency attributions.  For instance, change in speed plus change in direction might be 
sufficient to generate an attribution of a mind, even if nothing can be discerned about the goals or 
thoughts of that mind (Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000, 305).  Of course, as adults, we don’t cave to 
our first-blush intuitions of mentality here – we know, on slight reflection, that the images don’t 
have minds. Nonetheless, there presumably is a mechanism that generates these powerful, if 
                                                 
5 It’s possible that people regard the Heider-Simmel stimuli as fictional.  But the point can also 
be made by adverting to natural reactions to the emerging class of robots – Roombas and Rodney 
Brooks’ Mobots – that behave in goal-like ways. People even readily give names to these robots! 
Watching them just seems to trigger an attribution of mental states.  Thanks to Bernie Kobes for 
these points.  7 
 
overridable, inclinations to attribute mental states, and this mechanism likely plays an important 
role in everyday attributions of mental states.  
            Susan Johnson and colleagues use very different techniques to discern the mechanisms 
underlying the attribution of a mind to an individual. There are several ways that a baby might 
reveal that she thinks an object has a mind: she might follow the ‘gaze’ of the object, try to 
communicate with the object, imitate the behaviors of the object, or attribute goals to the object.  
By exploiting this variety of indicators, Johnson provides evidence that infants attribute minds as 
a result of particular kinds of relatively simple cues.  In a representative experiment, 12 month 
old infants were shown a fuzzy brown object under a variety of different conditions (Johnson, 
Slaughter and Carey, 1998).  In one condition, the fuzzy brown object (with no facial features) 
interacted contingently with the infant by beeping and flashing when the infant babbled or 
moved; in another condition, the fuzzy brown object exhibited an equivalent amount of flashing 
and beeping, but in this condition the activity was not contingent on the infant’s behavior.  In 
both conditions, children’s looking behavior was measured when the fuzzy brown object ‘gazed’ 
at one of two objects by making a smooth, 45 degree turn towards the object and remaining in 
this orientation for several seconds.  What Johnson and colleagues found was that infants were 
more likely to follow the ‘gaze’ of the fuzzy brown object when its beeping and flashing were 
contingent. In another set of conditions the fuzzy brown object did not flash or beep, but Johnson 
and colleagues found that babies were more likely to follow the ‘gaze’ of the fuzzy brown object 
when it had eyes than when it did not.  In other experiments, babies were shown a stuffed 
orangutan that had a face and exhibited contingent interaction.  Babies imitated the behavior of 
the stuffed animal and made communicative gestures toward it, indicating that the babies coded 
the object as having a mind (Johnson et al., 2001).  8 
 
In more recent experiments, Johnson and colleagues devised a new object, the blob, a 
bright green object about the shape of an adult shoe that had no facial features but could beep 
and move around on its own.  Again they explored contingent interaction, but in this case the 
contingent interaction was with a confederate rather than the baby herself. In one condition, a 
confederate engaged the blob in ‘small talk’, and the blob beeped contingently with the 
confederate; in the other condition the blob’s beeps were not contingent upon the confederate’s 
behavior.  Again they found that babies were more likely to follow the ‘gaze’ of the blob in the 
contingent interaction condition.   
Finally, and perhaps most impressively, the blob design has recently been coupled with 
Amanda Woodward’s goal attribution experiment. Woodward (1998) showed babies an arm 
moving towards one of two locations, each containing one of two objects. Then the locations of 
the objects were switched. Babies looked longer when the arm reached to the same location that 
now held a different object, suggesting that the babies expected the arm to reach for the same 
goal-object. Shimizu and Johnson (2004) found something similar with the blob – babies looked 
longer when the blob moved in the same direction but towards a different object. But this effect 
only occurred when the blob had behaved contingently with the confederate.  
Johnson suggests that this broad pattern of results is evidence that by 12 months, the 
infant has a conceptual representation of agent. Characteristics like eyes and contingent 
interaction trigger this conceptual representation, and this representation then sets up the pattern 
of behavioral responses that we see in the experiments. As Johnson puts it, ‘those characteristics 
invoke an intermediary representation (intermediary in the processing stream between perception 
and action) of intentional agent that is available to support multiple behaviors’ (Johnson, 2005, 
254, emphasis added).   9 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Network of AGENT concept 
Johnson’s suggestion that the concept of intentional agent is a critical intervening factor 
between the cues and the behavior can easily be expanded to accommodate the results from 
Heider and Simmel as well.  The distinctive motion trajectories of the animation triggers the 
intentional agent concept, which in turn sets up the disposition to attribute desires, intentions, 
and so forth.  Together, this generates the (partial) causal network depicted in figure 1.  ‘Agent’ 
as it’s used in this network is obviously something of a technical notion. It’s not clear that it 
corresponds to any term in vernacular English.  We will use AGE T to denote this technical 
category.
6  If an entity exhibits one of the relatively simple features mentioned above, this will 
                                                 
6 Importantly, this technical category stands in stark contrast to the sophisticated concepts of 
agency put forth in philosophical theories of agency. (Cf. Korsgaard, 2008)  Korsgaard, in the 
Kantian tradition, takes agents to be the sort of things that base their actions on principles of 
practical reasoning, including and especially principles of morality.  This position is 
representative of the sophisticated theories alluded to above, in that they define agency in terms 
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trigger the inclination to categorize the entity as an AGE T. Once an individual identifies an 
entity as an AGENT, this sets up certain dispositions in the person – e.g., the disposition to 
attribute goals, to imitate, and to anticipate goal directed behavior.
   
            Now we can state our proposal.  We maintain that, when it comes to the tendency to 
attribute mental states to an individual, there is nothing special about conscious mental states.  
Rather, once a person categorizes an individual as an AGENT, she will be inclined to attribute 
conscious mental states to the individual.
7  This account, which we’ll call the ‘AGENCY model’, 
                                                                                                                                                            
of the capacity to deliberate about reasons and principles when deciding how to behave.  The 
notion of agency at play in the current discussion is significantly simpler and is, at best, a 
conceptual precursor to the more sophisticated notion under consideration in philosophical 
theories of practical rationality, free will, moral responsibility, etc. Whereas such theories 
concern themselves with the sort of agency necessary for moral responsibility, free will, 
rationality, and so forth, we are here concerned with a much simpler notion.  Indeed, the 
technical category at work in the AGENCY model remains silent on such philosophical 
questions. 
7 For present purposes, we are neutral on whether the AGENT concept is innate.  However, 
comparative work by Mascalzoni et al. (2010) suggests that a similar mechanism may be in place 
in baby chickens.  If the same mechanism is in place in both humans and chickens, one might 
argue for innateness on broadly phylogenetic grounds.  If the concept is innate, then the view 
begins to look similar to Thomas Reid’s solution to the problem of other minds (1969 [1785]).  
Our point is that, regardless of how the AGENT concept is acquired, once an entity is 
categorized as an AGENT, an inclination to attribute conscious states to the entity will be 
present. 11 
 
can be represented as a minor adjustment to the network characterizing the AGENCY concept, 
yielding figure 2.  The AGENCY model builds naturally on the work in developmental 
psychology to explain what leads us to think that others have conscious states.  But there is a 
developing literature in philosophy and psychology that seems to challenge it.  
 
Figure 2: The AGENCY Model 
 
3. Agency and Experience: A Dissociation?  
 
We have suggested that the attribution of agency suffices to dispose one to attribute conscious 
experiences.  In a recent paper in Science, Heather Gray, Kurt Gray and Daniel Wegner have 
argued that agency and experience are independent dimensions of mental attributions.  Gray and 
colleagues collected data from over 2000 respondents to an online survey.  Participants were 
presented with 78 pairings of 13 different characters, and then asked to rate (on a 5-point Likert 
scale) which character had a greater capacity for possessing a certain particular mental trait (e.g., 
‘Which character is more capable of experiencing joy?’). The researchers maintain that the 
responses reveal two quite different dimensions of mind perception: Agency and Experience 
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(Gray et al., 2007, 619; see also Robbins and Jack, 2006).  Moreover, Gray and colleagues 
conclude from the data that the two features, Agency and Experience, can be dissociated.  God, 
for instance, rates at the top of the Agency scale, but at the absolute bottom of Experience; frogs 
and fetuses, conversely, rate high on the Experience scale while lacking any degree of Agency.  
Although the work of Gray and colleagues might be thought to challenge our AGENT-
based approach, there is a natural reply.  The capacities that fall under the category of Agency in 
their study are relatively sophisticated:  self-control, morality, memory, emotion recognition, 
planning, communication, and thought. Paradigmatic entities that would trigger AGENT in our 
sense, like frogs, are judged to lack many of those sophisticated capacities.  Thus, while frogs are 
extremely low on ‘agency’ by the standards of Gray and colleagues, frogs would certainly trigger 
the AGENT category on our notion of AGENT. Frogs have it all – eyes, contingent interaction, 
and distinctive motion trajectories. Furthermore, the traits that fall under Gray and colleague’s 
category of Experience also often involve sophisticated capacities, e.g., personality, pride, 
embarrassment, and joy.  So, Gray and colleagues’ results leave open the possibility that a 
minimal notion of agent of the sort we have in mind would produce a tendency to attribute 
minimal kinds of experience, like pain.  The AGENCY model aims to capture the most basic 
features that generate the disposition to attribute the most basic conscious states.  As a result, the 
model isn’t threatened by the findings of Gray and colleagues.  
Joshua Knobe and Jesse Prinz present a different kind of evidential argument for 
dissociating agency and experience, suggesting that people attribute agency while positively 
resisting consciousness attributions.  Their studies focus on attributions of mental states to 
groups.  In one study, Knobe and Prinz presented subjects with two sets of sentences; one set 
attributed non-conscious mental states to a group entity, while another attributed conscious 13 
 
mental states to that same entity.  The non-conscious state attributions consisted of sentences like 
‘Acme Corp intends to release a new product this January’ and ‘Acme Corp wants to change its 
corporate image.’  The conscious state attributions included such sentences as ‘Acme Corp is 
now experiencing great joy’ and ‘Acme Corp is feeling excruciating pain.’ Knobe and Prinz 
found that subjects rated sentences about Acme Corp.’s non-conscious mental states as sounding 
‘natural’, while they rated sentences about Acme Corp.’s conscious mental states as sounding 
‘weird’.  The moral of these experiments, they say, is that ‘people are unwilling to ascribe to 
group agents states that require phenomenal consciousness’ (Knobe and Prinz, 2008).
8  
Knobe and Prinz’s work indicates that people might regard groups as agents in some 
sense, for people seem comfortable attributing desires and plans to groups.  But it’s possible that 
                                                 
8 One possible deflationary interpretation of Knobe and Prinz's results is that participants were 
speaking figuratively when attributing mental states to groups.  We conducted pilot studies to 
investigate this possibility. To screen out those who fail to distinguish between literal and 
figurative language, we gave subjects a series of sentences, some clearly figurative (e.g., 
‘Einstein was an egghead’) and some clearly literal (e.g., ‘Carpenters build houses’), and asked 
them to rate those sentences on a 7-point Likert scale of literalness (1= ‘Figuratively True’ 7= 
‘Literally True’). We also provided those subjects with sentences attributing different mental 
states to individuals (e.g., ‘Some millionaires want tax cuts’) and to groups (e.g., ‘Some 
corporations want tax cuts’), and compared their judgments regarding different types of mental 
states.  We found that when subjects rated group attributions, they tended to rate non-conscious 
state attributions as ‘literally true’ and gave significantly higher ratings for non-conscious than 
conscious mental state attributions (t(66) =7.735, p<.001).  For further discussion of Knobe and 
Prinz's experiments, see Arico (2010) and Sytsma and Machery (2009). 14 
 
groups do not activate the primitive notion of AGENCY that we posit.
  Indeed, although this has 
not been studied yet, we suspect that there is a developmental pattern concerning the attribution 
of mental states to groups such that young children will be less likely than adults to attribute 
mental states to groups. If this turns out to be right, it would suggest that children are not 
identifying groups as AGENTS in our sense.
9  
                                                 
9 Bryce Huebner (2010) has suggested that folk psychology functions differently in attributions 
of beliefs (Agency, loosely speaking) than in attributions of pains and emotions (Experience). 
Huebner found that people attribute beliefs but not conscious states to robots. Furthermore, other 
research has found that people are reluctant to attribute pain and emotion to robots even when the 
robots are described as exhibiting appropriate behavior (Sytsma and Machery, 2010).  Once 
again, this suggests that there is an attribution of AGENCY with no concomitant inclination to 
attribute conscious states.  But alternative explanations are available.  One is that, as we 
suggested for Knobe and Prinz, the AGENCY category is not really triggered by the robots.  
However, given that Huebner’s stimuli included a photo of a robot that possessed one of the 
relatively simple features that serve as cues mentioned above (eyes), this is not a satisfactory 
explanation. Another possible explanation is that the AGENT category is triggered in Huebner’s 
subjects and does, in fact, generate the disposition to attribute conscious states, but that 
disposition is subsequently suppressed.  Perhaps the disposition is suppressed by some generally-
held social schema about robots and sensations/emotions; or perhaps it is suppressed by higher-
order deliberations about the robot’s physiological makeup.  Whatever the reason might be for 
suppressing the disposition, Huebner’s results are problematic for the AGENCY model only in 
so far as it can be shown that subjects were not initially disposed to attribute phenomenology to 
the robots. 15 
 
Moreover, as argued elsewhere (Arico, 2010; Sytsma and Machery, 2009), there are 
methodological worries with the Knobe and Prinz experiments that call their conclusion into 
question. For instance, Knobe and Prinz found that subjects rated sentences attributing 
phenomenal mental states to groups as sounding ‘weirder’ (less natural) than sentences 
attributing non-phenomenal mental states to groups. However, Knobe and Prinz stimuli were not 
minimal pairs: sentences attributing non-phenomenal states included additional contextual 
information that phenomenal attributions lacked.
10  Though Knobe and Prinz interpret the 
difference in sentence ratings as evidence of the folk (tacitly) distinguishing between 
phenomenal and non-phenomenal states, Arico (2010) provides some evidence that the 
difference is actually produced by the disparity in contextual information between the two kinds 
of sentences.   
It is important to note that neither Gray and colleagues nor Knobe and Prinz present a 
positive proposal about the descriptive question with which we started – what features trigger our 
attributions of conscious states? This is not surprising given that a central purpose of their 
accounts was to show the independence of experience and agency.  But it does mean that their 
accounts do not yet give a full answer to the question, ‘why do we believe that others have 
conscious mental states?’  And of course that’s exactly what the AGENCY model attempts to do. 
In what follows we will explain the model and its empirical commitments in more detail.  
 
4. The AGE CY Model  
 
We suspect that a more fundamental notion of ‘agency’ does provide a sufficient basis for 
                                                 
10  ‘Acme Corp is upset about the court’s recent ruling’ vs. ‘Acme Corp is feeling upset.’ 16 
 
attributing conscious states.  We have focused on the relatively simple features that serve as 
cues, which trigger the AGENT concept.  But of course these sorts of cues are not the only way 
to activate the AGENT concept.  For example, merely thinking about an acquaintance (who is 
not physically present) may trigger the AGENT concept.  Relatedly, if a trusted source of 
testimony tells me that there is a person in the other room, then this will typically lead me to 
think that there is an AGENT in the other room.  For our purposes, the role of the relatively 
simple features that serve as cues is especially important, since we are particularly interested in 
identifying a set of minimal sufficient conditions for attributing conscious states. The key idea is 
that relatively simple features (e.g., motion pattern, facial features, contingent interaction) will 
suffice to trigger AGENT categorization, and this will in turn produce an inclination to attribute 
conscious states to the individual.  Hence, the core of the AGENCY model is a causal sufficiency 
thesis:  
Sufficiency Thesis. Typically, if an entity is categorized as an AGENT, then there will be 
an inclination for attributing conscious states to that entity.  
We take the sufficiency thesis to be central to the AGENCY model.  But we also want to 
promote a more specific view about the nature of the process that generates these attributions.  
The research on animations (e.g. Heider and Simmel, 1944) suggests that the distinctive motion 
trajectories lead to attributions of goals and intentions by a process that is fast, automatic, and 
unavailable to introspection (see, e.g., Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000).  Following Johnson (2005) 
we’ve suggested that this process is mediated by triggering the concept AGENT.  On our 
AGENCY model, the disposition to attribute conscious states follows from triggering this 
concept.  As a result, it’s natural to maintain that the attribution of conscious states mediated by 
the AGENT concept is generated by a process that is fast, automatic, and unavailable to 17 
 
introspection.  This is not, of course, the only way that an attribution of consciousness can come 
about. Our model allows for attributions of consciousness that do not involve these quick, 
automatic inclinations.  The model thus aligns with various dual-process pictures, according to 
which, in addition to quick, automatic, low-level cognitive processes there are slow, deliberative, 
controlled, high-level reasoning processes capable of operating on the same domain (see, e.g., 
Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich and West, 2002).   
With the dual process framework in the background, we can now state a further, more 
ambitious thesis of the AGENCY model.  We suggest that typically the only way to get the fast, 
automatic, gut-level inclination to attribute conscious states to an entity is by triggering the 
AGENT concept.  That is, categorizing an object as an AGENT is causally necessary for a 
certain sort of inclination to attribute conscious states:  
 ecessity Thesis. Typically, there will be a quick, automatic inclination for attributing 
conscious states to an entity only if that entity is categorized as an AGENT.  
The claim is qualified to allow for the possibility that we might attribute consciousness to an 
entity on the basis of more deliberate, controlled processes.  But to get the gut-level immediate 
inclination to attribute consciousness requires categorizing the object as an AGENT.  
The sufficiency thesis suggests that if a person categorizes an object as an AGENT, then 
she will be disposed to attribute conscious states to that object.  This produces the interesting 
prediction that even relatively simple features will generate an inclination to attribute conscious 
states to an object.  The necessity thesis predicts that if a person rejects the categorization of 
AGENT for a given object, then she will typically not have the automatic inclination to attribute 
conscious states to the object.  
Insects provide an intriguing real-world test case here.  Insects are widely regarded 18 
 
among neuroscientists as incapable of experiences like pain, since they lack the relevant neural 
structures.  Nonetheless, insects exhibit all of the simple features reviewed above – eyes, 
distinctive motion trajectories, and contingent interaction—that serve as cues for categorizing a 
thing as an AGENT.  As a result, the AGENCY model predicts that insects should be categorized 
as AGENTS and, as a result, people should have a greater tendency to attribute conscious states 
to insects than to objects like clouds and rivers that lack the central cues of AGENCY and 
presumably do not get categorized as AGENTS.   
 
5. Experiment  
 
In order to test the AGENCY Model, we ran a reaction-time study in which subjects were 
presented with a sequence of Object/Attribution pairs.  In the present study, we were interested 
to learn about the processes underlying folk attributions of states that psychologists and 
philosophers typically consider conscious or phenomenal, rather than the folk’s categorizations 
of certain states as ‘conscious’.
 As such, the attributions we examined specified states or 
properties that we take to be paradigmatic of phenomenally conscious experience, such as ‘Feels 
Happy’ and ‘Feels Pain’.
 11 Objects were drawn from several categories, including Vehicles, 
                                                 
11 We follow philosophical tradition in taking pain to be a paradigmatic example of a 
phenomenally conscious state. For an alternative view, see Carruthers, 2004. AlsoSytsma and 
Machery (2010) maintain that the folk conception of subjective experience is importantly 
different than the corresponding philosophical conception. Still, they recognize that a state like 
‘feeling pain’ is traditionally taken to be a phenomenally conscious state. Whether the folk 
conceptualize it as such (tacitly or explicitly) has no bearing on the discussion at hand (Cf. fn 1). 19 
 
Insects, and Plants.   
Because the model we are proposing describes a low-level cognitive process that, we 
suggest, reacts automatically to simple features, we wanted to measure the mental chronometry 
for attributions of conscious states to various objects.  Thus, for each Object/Attribution pair, 
subjects were asked to respond as quickly as possible (Yes or No) whether the object has the 
attribute. The AGENCY model makes predictions both about overt responses and about reaction 
times. For overt responses, the core of the AGENCY model, the sufficiency thesis, predicts that 
subjects should exhibit a tendency to attribute conscious states to objects that are likely to trigger 
AGENT categorization.  Since insects exhibit the simple features that trigger the AGENT 
concept, and so are likely to be categorized as AGENTS, they are of particular interest.  What 
will be especially telling will be to contrast the responses to insects with responses to objects that 
seem unlikely to trigger the AGENT concept, including individuals in the categories Vehicles, 
Natural Moving Objects, and Plants.  The necessity thesis generates the further prediction that 
under speeded conditions, participants should not be inclined to make overt attributions of 
conscious states to objects that are not categorized as AGENT.    
In a reaction time paradigm, faster response times suggest that the responses are dictated 
(largely, if not exclusively) by  lower-level, automatic processes, while longer reaction times 
suggest that the responses are influenced by higher-level considerations, deliberations, 
associations, etc. Given this (standard) interpretation of response times, the sufficiency thesis 
predicts slower reaction times when participants deny conscious state attributions to objects that 
are typically classified as AGENTS (as compared broadly to non-AGENTS).  The idea is that 
even if someone were to overtly express the belief that insects don’t feel pain (e.g. because they 
lack appropriate neural structures), she would still have an strong, automatic inclination to think 20 
 
that they do feel pain; she thus has to overcome that automatic inclination to get out her answer 
of ‘no’, and this will take some extra time.
12 Or, to put it more colorfully, when I am asked 
whether ants feel pain, there is a little guy inside of me saying ‘yes!’ And I need to repress that 
guy before I can get out my ‘no’ response.
13  By contrast, there’s no little guy inside of me 
saying that trucks or rivers feel pain, so my denial in those cases should not be delayed in this 
way. Finally, the necessity thesis predicts that, for anything that is not counted as an AGENT, 
there will be no immediate inclination to attribute conscious states, so there should be no 
hesitation to respond ‘no’ for anything that does not trigger the AGENT concept.
14  
                                                 
12 A bit more fully, the prediction goes as follows. The presence of the cues biases the subject 
toward categorizing the individual as an AGENT with the consequent inclination to attribute 
conscious states to the individual; but competing processes defy these attributions. This creates 
an uncertainty that takes time to resolve, driving up RT times as a result.  Since the whole issue 
here is about processing time, the way to investigate these matters is by testing performance 
under speeded conditions. 
13 This tendency may be so strong as to persist even after extensive instruction and experiences 
in the domain.  Goldberg and Thompson-Schill (2009) found that even biology professors made 
predictable, childish mistakes and slower reaction times on a speeded classification task of 
living/nonliving.  Likewise, although neuroscientists might deny that insects feel pain, our bet is 
that they too would be significantly slower in those denials and be more likely to make mistakes 
(by their own lights) in speeded conditions. 
14 The differences between the RT predictions flowing from the sufficiency and necessity theses 
is that the sufficiency thesis only says that we should expect faster denials (of conscious states) 
for at least some individuals that don’t get categorized as AGENTs.  The necessity thesis makes 21 
 
   
Method  
Participants  
Thirty-four participants (14 male, 20 female, mean age = 19.2) from the University of Pittsburgh 
volunteered for this study to fulfill course requirements.  
   
Materials  
Subjects performed a timed property-attribution task, in which they were asked to respond 
positively or negatively to a series of questions attributing different sorts of properties to 
different sorts of entities.  Properties included ‘Feels Anger’, ‘Feels Happy’, ‘Hunts’, ‘Made of 
Metal’, ‘Feels Pain’, ‘Feels Pride’, ‘Is A Living Thing’, and ‘Is Colored White’.  Entities 
included fifteen word items for each of eight categories: Mammals, Birds, Insects, Plants, 
Artifacts, Vehicles, Inanimate Natural Objects (e.g., stone, mountain), and Moving Natural 
Objects (e.g., cloud, blizzard). All category items were matched for letter length, number of 
syllables, and lexical familiarity.   
 
Procedure  
The experiment used a within-subjects design. All stimuli were presented using E-Prime 
software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh PA), which measured participants’ response 
time for each trial.  Participants were required to make a speeded response within two seconds 
before the next item was automatically presented and with a response the next item was 
                                                                                                                                                            
the stronger claim that we should typically expect fast denials for any individual that doesn’t get 
categorized as AGENT. 22 
 
presented.  For each category (e.g., Insect, Plant), all subjects responded to 120 stimulus items (8 
property attributions [e.g., feels pain, feels pride] x 15 entities [e.g., for Insect: bee, wasp]).  
Since our primary interest was in the attribution of simple conscious states, we collapsed 
responses to ‘feels anger’, ‘feels happy’ and ‘feels pain’ for our analyses.   We preplanned 
comparisons for overt responses to attributions of these simple conscious states between the 
Insect category and the categories of Vehicles, Moving Natural Objects, and Plants.  We also 
preplanned comparisons of reaction times of negative responses to simple conscious states 
between the category of insect and the categories of Vehicle, Moving Natural Objects, and 
Plants.  
 
Results  
As predicted, participants were significantly more likely (all p’s <.001) to attribute simple 
conscious states (pain, happy, anger) to insects (70% of trials) than to Plants (10%) or items that 
exhibit motion, including Vehicles (6%) and Natural Moving Objects (6 %). (See chart 1). Also 
as predicted, participants were also significantly slower to reject the attributions of simple 
conscious states to insects (670 ms) than to natural moving objects (610 ms) (t(33) = 2.17, p 
<.05) or vehicles (616 ms)  (t(33) = 2.39, p <.05).  Contrary to our predictions, no significant 
difference in response times was found between insects and plants (651 ms). 23 
 
 
In light of the failure to find a significant difference in RTs between insects and plants, 
we conducted additional analyses comparing Plants to Vehicles and Natural Moving Objects. To 
our surprise, we found that participants were also more likely to ascribe simple conscious states 
to Plants than to Vehicles (t(33) = 3.28, p <.01) and Natural Moving Objects (t(33) = 4.79, p < 
.001). Participants also demonstrated significantly slower RTs for denying simple conscious 
states to plants  (651 ms) as compared to natural moving objects (t(33) = 4.26, p <.001) and to 
vehicles (t(33) = 4.73, p <.001).  (See chart 2).  
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To verify the generalizability of these effects across the items selected, item analyses 
(averaging across subjects, treating each item as a random variable in the analysis) replicated 
each of these effects (p’s < .001). As a control on whether the effect with insect RTs was simply 
a general feature of how people respond to insects, we looked at the reactions times for denying a 
superficial property (e.g., colored white) to an object. No significant differences in response time 
were found between insects, plants, vehicles, and natural moving objects for these cases.
15  
                                                 
15 One might take a deflationary stance toward the results of the experiment, holding that they do 
not call for the postulation of any specialized mental mechanism.  Instead, the results might be 
explicable in terms of prior beliefs about the relevant categories.  It might be that subjects take 
longer to respond to PAIN/INSECT stimuli because they do not have any prior beliefs about the 
presence or absence of conscious states in insects, and so they have to deliberate longer. By 
contrast, it might be that subjects do have prior knowledge that mammals, birds and so forth do 
have conscious states, and that artifacts, natural objects and so forth do not have conscious states.  
So responding to the insect stimuli requires some on-the-spot deliberation, whereas responding 
Chart 2 25 
 
 
6. Discussion  
 
The experiment supports the central hypothesis of the AGENCY model: that categorizing an 
entity as AGENT is typically sufficient for generating an inclination to attribute conscious 
states.  The overt responses suggest that being identified as an AGENT generates strong 
inclination to attribute simple conscious states.  In particular, insects, but not vehicles or clouds 
or rivers, were judged to have conscious states.
16  The reaction time data tell a similar story. 
                                                                                                                                                            
to the other categories does not. (Dave Schmitz and an anonymous referee have raised objections 
along these lines.)   
  There are a couple of reasons to doubt that this deflationary interpretation is correct.  
First, although the RTs for a No response to insects is significantly greater than RTs for other 
categories, the difference is on the order of 50 milliseconds.  If the differential response reflected 
the necessity of conscious deliberation in the case of insects, one would expect a much larger 
difference.  Second, we see no obvious reason for expecting people to have existing beliefs about 
the mental states of mammals and birds and plants, but not insects. In the absence of evidence for 
thinking that subjects lack beliefs specifically and uniquely about insect consciousness, there 
seems little positive reason to adopt this interpretation of the data.  Nonetheless, it is an 
empirically-testable hypothesis that calls for further research on the matter. 
16 The virtue of using familiar objects like insects, birds, and vehicles, is that the examples are 
ecologically realistic. We aren’t using some completely artificial psychological construct.  
However, when using familiar objects, it’s hard to exclude all effects of training and education 
even while the word items used were extensively controlled to minimize these differences.  As a 26 
 
Again, our prediction was that there would be a tendency to attribute simple conscious states like 
pain to insects, so denying that insects feel pain would require one to override an initial natural 
inclination.
17  As predicted, we found that denials of simple conscious states to insects were 
indeed much slower than denials of such states to vehicles and natural moving objects.
18  
                                                                                                                                                            
result, to make a persuasive case for the AGENCY model, it will be important to supplement our 
results. And perhaps the most important way to supplement the results is by using unfamiliar, 
novel objects.  That, of course, is a central virtue of the work by Heider and Simmel and 
Johnson.  To further explore the AGENCY model, it will be important to follow up that work by 
looking directly at attributions of conscious states.  So, for instance, in the standard method 
developed by Johnson, infants will come to regard the blob (a very un-AGENT like entity) as an 
AGENT if it beeps contingently with a person’s speech.  This raises an obvious question about 
attribution of conscious states.  Would infants in the contingent interaction condition be more 
likely to regard the blob as suffering pain if it were visibly damaged (as compared to a non-
contingently interacting condition)?  Our model predicts that they would, but the relevant 
experiments remain to be conducted.  
17 There is a further question about why we attribute the particular states that we do (in this case, 
pain, anger, and happiness).  Then there is the broader question of exactly what’s included 
within the range of states that we are sometimes willing to attribute to AGENTS. We leave this 
as an important area for future research. 
18 Because participants only had two seconds to respond to each item, it’s unlikely that 
differences were caused by extended deliberations on each item. Rather, these response time 
differences are likely to reflect more immediate decision processes as shown in seminal and 27 
 
The necessity thesis – the claim that AGENCY is necessary for the immediate inclination 
to attribute conscious states – also looks to get some support from the overt responses.  Overall, 
items that lacked AGENCY cues were unlikely to be afforded the simple conscious states. 
Insects were overwhelmingly more likely to be granted simple conscious states than were the 
items that did not have paradigmatic AGENCY features.  But the situation with RTs is more 
complex.  Participants showed slower response times when denying simple conscious states to 
plants as compared with similar responses to vehicles and natural moving objects, and this seems 
to run contrary to the prediction generated by the necessity thesis: that only items categorized as 
AGENTS will generate the automatic inclination to attribute conscious states to the item. 
As noted, the RT evidence on plants contravened our predictions, and this demands 
further consideration of how to model the role of AGENCY in the attribution of conscious states.  
There are a number of different models that can accommodate the data. We will not try to be 
exhaustive.  Instead, we will review three models that we find especially interesting.  First, 
though, we would like to note that in this experiment we also collected responses for each item 
on whether or not the object ‘is a living thing’.  In contrast to vehicles and natural moving 
objects, participants overwhelmingly judged insects and plants to be living things.  So, 
throughout our discussion we will rely on the idea that plants (and insects) are coded as 
ALIVE.
19  The relevance of this fact will become more salient in the following discussion of the 
three explanatory models. 
                                                                                                                                                            
contemporary accounts of semantic processing based on these types of response time differences 
(e.g. McCloskey and Glucksberg, 1979; Smith et al., 1974). 
19 Still, as noted above for the AGENT concept, we want to allow for the possibility that the 
ALIVE concept is not a perfect match for any word in English.  28 
 
One possibility is to retain the AGENCY model and explain away the unexpected 
reaction times for plants.  For instance, since many things coded as ALIVE are also AGENTS, 
ALIVE might have high cue validity – it might provide a good heuristic for thinking that an 
object has mental states.  That is, if something is coded as ALIVE then that’s a good cue that it’s 
an AGENT, even though it remains possible for something to be coded as ALIVE but not as 
AGENT.
20  As a result, it takes some time to process the fact that plants fall into the class of 
things that are ALIVE but not AGENTS (this proposal is illustrated in figure 3). The key point of 
this model is that people do not actually have a disposition to go all the way with attribution of 
conscious states to plants.  Rather, they just need to do a bit more processing in order to exclude 
plants than they do for vehicles.  Note that this would also explain why there were comparatively 
few overt responses in favor of plants having simple conscious states.  
                                                 
20 As we discuss in the following section, there is some evidence in the developmental 
psychology literature for thinking that categorizing plants as AGENTs is, in fact, a prerequisite 
for categorizing plants as ALIVE.  That is, rather than merely seeing ALIVE as a highly-valid 
cue for AGENCY, we might see ALIVE categorizations as being routed through AGENT 
categorizations.   29 
 
 
Figure 3: The Agency Model, with ALIVE as cue  
A second possible model holds that categorizing an object as ALIVE is actually a 
(previously unnoticed) cue, which then triggers the individual to categorize that object as 
AGENT.  That is, perhaps activating the notion that a thing is ALIVE would also activate the 
notion of AGENT.
21  We’ll call this the LIFE-to-AGENCY model (see figure 4).  On such an 
account, the presumed tendency to attribute conscious states to plants is mediated by the AGENT 
attribution.   
                                                 
21 It is also, of course, possible that categorizing an individual as an AGENT would bring with it 
the categorization of the individual as ALIVE.  For instance, it might be that once the child 
identifies Johnson’s blob as an AGENT, the child would also think of the blob as ALIVE.  We 
set this issue aside for present purposes. 
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Figure 4: Life-to-Agency Model 
A third and much more dramatic possibility is that AGENCY is not the important 
category at all.  Perhaps what really matters for attributing conscious states is categorizing an 
object as ALIVE (as depicted in figure 5).  This explanatory model provides a new way to 
defend the view that agency and experience are independent dimensions.  An object, according 
to this explanation, can be regarded as something that is capable of having experiences even if it 
is not regarded as an AGENT.  This approach would suggest that the deep conceptual link is not 
between AGENCY and consciousness, but rather between LIFE and consciousness.  As such, we 
call this the LIFE model. 
Figure 5: Life Model 
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7. Developmental questions  
 
The evidence from our experiment does not decide between the three positive models we’ve just 
sketched.  Nonetheless, we can begin to adjudicate between them by considering data from 
related areas of inquiry. One critical source of evidence for deciding between the models is 
developmental. We know that in our experiment, adults tended to overtly deny that plants have 
conscious states.  But given their reaction times, the question is whether there is an automatic 
inclination in favor of attributing conscious states to plants which then gets suppressed.  If there 
is an automatic inclination to make such attributions, then we might find fully overt attributions 
of conscious states to plants if we look earlier in development, before children have acquired 
whatever it is that suppresses overt attributions in adults.   
In a pair of classic studies, Inagaki and Hatano (1987, 1991) found that Japanese children 
attributed conscious states to tulips.  Strikingly, they found that most children (72%) in their 
study said that tulips feel pain, but most (80%) deny that stones feel pain.  The children also 
overwhelmingly (98%) denied that tulips think (1987, 1016).  This is a significant data point in 
favor of the idea that attributions of LIFE are sufficient to generate the tendency to attribute 
simple conscious states. However, one (deflationary) explanation for the Inagaki and Hatano 
results is that the results are culturally specific to Japanese children.   
Recent work by Jane Erickson and Frank Keil (2008) suggests that the attribution of 
mental states to plants is not isolated to Japanese children. Erickson and Keil offered American 
children different kinds of explanations for a variety of entities, including humans, plants, and 
non-living natural kinds.  In one experiment, the child’s task was to evaluate the quality of a 
psychological explanation for a behavior exhibited by different kinds of entities. The 32 
 
experimenters showed a picture of a plant growing toward the sun and offered the following 
psychological explanation:  ‘The flower grew towards the sun because it felt tired and hungry 
and knew that the sunlight would give it energy to make food.’  Children regarded such a 
psychological explanation as apt for plants, but they rejected parallel psychological explanations 
for artifacts and non-living natural kinds.  In addition, Erickson and Keil found a developmental 
progression – older children were less likely to allow psychological explanations for plants 
(though they continued to regard plants as exhibiting goal-directed behavior). All of this seems 
to fit with the possibility that the AGENCY model is completely misguided and should be 
rejected in favor of the LIFE model. For the data leaves open the possibility that LIFE is the 
operative categorization behind the immediate inclination to attribute conscious mental states.  
Combined with our own evidence with respect to reaction times for plants, one might 
construe the evidence from Inagaki and Hatano and Erickson and Keil as thoroughly 
undercutting the AGENCY model.  After all, one might take these studies to show that children 
are willing to attribute psychological states to plants based solely on the fact that plants are alive; 
and if LIFE suffices to generate the inclination to attribute conscious states to an individual, then 
there seems to be no need to appeal to AGENCY to explain the inclination to attribute conscious 
states to people and insects.  Although this looks very bleak indeed for the AGENCY model, 
recent work by John Opfer and colleagues motives a much more favorable interpretation of the 
foregoing results. Opfer (2002) showed subjects—both children and adults—a series of videos in 
which irregularly-shaped blobs moved along various paths.  Among other things, the task 
required subjects to determine what the object was. In one condition, the videos included goal 
objects that corresponded to the blob’s movement, while in the other condition, the videos did 
not include goal objects; they then presented subjects with a battery of attributions that included 33 
 
both psychological traits and biological traits.  According to these studies, attributions of life 
themselves depend on the individual seeing the entity as a goal-directed agent.  Even children as 
young as 5 years old, they say, relied on the blob’s motion being goal-directed in order to 
attribute to it either biological states (like being alive) or mental states (like being happy or 
feeling pain).  Opfer observes, ‘the goal-directedness appeared to be the decisive factor in these 
displays: identical blobs that moved identically but towards no goal failed to convince children 
and adults that they were living things.’(116)   
In a separate study, Opfer and Siegel (2004) found that 5-year-olds did not initially take 
plants either to be alive or to behave in goal-directed manners. Indeed, Opfer and Siegel found 
that most children only take animals to be alive. Yet when told that plants move towards sources 
of nutrition, such as sunlight and water,
22 5-year-olds inferred that these motions were goal-
directed.  Importantly, Opfer and Siegel also found that the attributions of life seem to depend on 
attributing goal-directedness to the entity:  
The changes in categorization by children in the teleology feedback group suggest that 
although 5-year-olds initially categorized only animals as living things, the preschoolers’ 
concept of living things included capacity for goal-directed movement as an important 
property of life. After the preschoolers learned that plants, like animals, were capable of 
goal-directed movement, they quickly inferred that plants, like animals, are alive. 
Conversely, children who failed to revise their judgments about teleological agency also 
failed to revise their life judgments. (321) 
While most of the children in the study initially categorized animals--but not plants--as living 
                                                 
22 Opfer and Siegel label the group of children who received this information about plants the 
‘teleology feedback’ condition. 34 
 
things, the data from this study suggests that the exclusion of plants arises from the failure to 
recognize that plants display goal-directed behavior.  Opfer and Siegal write, ‘once children 
conclude that plants can act in goal-directed, self-sustaining ways, they also conclude that plants 
are alive.’(329)  This casts an entirely new light on the results concerning attribution of 
consciousness to plants.  Although one might initially be inclined to interpret the data from 
Inagaki and Hatano or Erickson and Keil as undercutting the AGENCY models, this 
interpretation seems less plausible in light of the fact that the attribution of life itself seems to 
depend on the recognition of an entity as a goal directed entity. 
Moreover, considering the work by Opfer and colleagues, it now seems natural to 
interpret the Erickson and Keil data as providing some support for the AGENCY model.  
Erickson and Keil offered an explanation of plant behavior that was explicitly goal directed.  To 
accept these explanations (as the children do) is to accept a goal-directed understanding of 
plants.  According to the AGENCY model, AGENTs are, inter alia, the sorts of things that we 
are inclined to attribute goals to.  That children approve of psychological explanations of goal-
directed behavior attributed to plants just seems to show that, once children see plants as the 
sorts of entities that have goals and behave according to those goals, they are inclined to say that 
plants also can have psychological states. As such, Erickson and Keil's data seem to provide 
evidence that, once they are primed to categorize plants as AGENTs, children are inclined to 
attribute psychological states to plants.  And that just is what the AGENCY model predicts.
23 
                                                 
23 If categorizing plants as ALIVE requires categorizing them as AGENTs, then the necessity 
thesis is also preserved: the delayed responses for plants are no longer an obvious counter-
example, since the initial inclination to attribute simple conscious states can plausibly be 
explained by attributions of LIFE tacitly depending upon attributions of AGENT. 35 
 
 
8. Philosophical Implications  
 
Our proposed account has some relatively clear implications regarding the descriptive problem 
of other conscious minds. The picture on offer suggests that our cognitive systems are 
differentially sensitive to very specific features – eyes, distinctive motion trajectories and 
contingent interaction –the detection of which is normally causally sufficient to bias the subject 
toward attribution of conscious states. Importantly, the cognitive processes that operate on these 
low-level cues appear to operate even when global considerations militate against the idea that 
the target has mental states. For example, my belief that a triangle from Heider and Simmel’s 
animation is not a mentalistic agent does not stop me from seeing the triangle as ‘wanting to get 
out of the box’. Similarly, my belief that insects are not conscious does not prevent me from 
having the inclination to attribute pain and anger to them. The simple features suffice to trigger 
the inclination to attribute conscious states. It is natural to think of the relevant cognitive process 
as exhibiting two central features of modularity: domain specificity and informational 
encapsulation (Fodor, 1983). The process is domain specific to the extent that a limited number 
of simple features are able to trigger that process. In the normal case, things like clouds, 
blizzards, cars and mountains do not exhibit the right sorts of features, and hence fail to trigger 
the process.
24 Since the relevant process fails to incorporate important information from the 
subject’s broader set of beliefs (for example, the belief that that triangle is literally a two-
dimensional figure), the process also seems, to that extent, informationally encapsulated. These 
                                                 
24 Of course, such objects may appear to exhibit some of these features under abnormal 
circumstances. 36 
 
points apply equally to the various models under consideration (whether they give a central role 
to AGENCY, LIFE, or both), for all models give special weight to a small set of relatively 
simple featural cues.  
Consider again the two traditional answers to the descriptive problem of other conscious 
minds: analogy and inference to the best explanation. Both analogical reasoning and inference to 
the best explanation are thought to be paradigm cases of non-modular processing (Fodor 1983, 
88-89, 107). First, neither process is domain specific: analogies can in principle relate anything 
to anything, and explanations can in principle target arbitrary explanatory domains. And second, 
neither analogical reasoning nor inference-to-the-best-explanation is informationally 
encapsulated; both are highly sensitive to information from all over the cognitive system (Fodor, 
1983, 104-107). If this assessment of the processes is correct, then there is a tension between the 
traditional answers to the descriptive problem of other conscious minds and the view that we are 
promoting.  For unlike traditional accounts, on our account it is natural to view some of the 
mental processes responsible for the attribution of conscious states as modular.  
The modularity hypothesis provides a familiar framework for articulating the difference 
between the AGENCY model and the traditional analogy and best-explanation models.  But the 
important differences can still be drawn without adopting the modularity framework. The 
important point is that on the AGENCY model, the way we attribute consciousness to other 
things often involves simple cues (like contingent behavior) that quickly, automatically, and 
effortlessly trigger the AGENT concept, which in turn leads directly to an inclination to attribute 
conscious states.  These operations differ radically from traditional intellectualist processes like 
analogical reasoning and inference to the best explanation. This point again resonates with 
various dual-process models that describe two distinct pathways for reaching the attributions. 37 
 
Kahneman provides a nice summary of dual-process architecture:  
The operations of System 1 are typically fast, automatic, effortless, associative, implicit 
(not available to introspection), and often emotionally charged; they are also governed by 
habit and are therefore difficult to control or modify. The operations of System 2 are 
slower, serial, effortful, more likely to be consciously monitored and deliberately 
controlled (Kahneman, 2003, 698). 
Regarding attributions of consciousness, we have essentially been developing an account of a 
System 1 or low road process involving automatic processing of relatively simple featural cues. 
But we also believe that people have another pathway for attributing conscious states, a high 
road process involving relatively slow, controlled and deliberative reasoning (see Fiala et al. 
forthcoming).  
In addition to the implications for the traditional descriptive problem of other minds, the 
models we’ve sketched here might also have import for the status of particular intuitions about 
the consciousness (or not) of other entities. A number of prominent philosophers have built 
explicit theories of mind partly on the basis of our intuitions about what is conscious and what is 
not. One such case is Ned Block’s famous example in which we are to imagine that all the 
residents of China are rigged up with radio transmitters so as to functionally mimic a living brain 
(Block, 1980). The intuitive reaction to this case is presumably that the nation of China (as a 
whole) does not have any mental states, and surely not any conscious states! This is then 
supposed to support the conclusion that merely getting a system to functionally mimic a brain 
does not make that system conscious. For intuitively, it seems clear that functionally organizing 
the residents of China to behave like a brain would not make the collective nation have conscious 
states.  38 
 
Notice, however, that if our proposal is correct, there is a potential explanation for these 
intuitions that does not involve the denial that the nation of China enjoys conscious states. 
Instead, it may be that the example tends to provoke these intuitions because the sorts of featural 
cues that typically incline a subject toward attributions of consciousness are not salient with 
respect to the nation of China.
25 Each Chinese person, on the other hand, does possess the 
relevant cues (which are readily imaginable when considering Block's scenario). Hence, we have 
an inclination to attribute conscious states to individual Chinese people, but not to the nation of 
China. This is just one example, but it illustrates how the answer to the descriptive problem 
might influence the way the relevant intuitions are used in philosophical debate. For depending 
on what one thinks about the epistemic status of the relevant psychological processes, one might 
be led either to dismiss the intuitions, or to give them special weight.
 26 
An answer to the descriptive problem might also bear on the idea that people intuitively 
                                                 
25 This is not to say that the only path to attributions of consciousness is via the simple cues.  
Rather, the point is that if an entity fails to manifest the cues that trigger the AGENCY category, 
then it will be significantly less natural to attribute conscious states to that entity. Instead, 
attributions of consciousness in such cases are likely to be the result of deliberate high-level 
reasoning.  
26 Huebner, Bruno, and Sarkissian (2010) present some evidence that intuitions regarding the 
conscious states of group entities (like the Nation of China) are culturally diverse. They found 
that English-speaking students in Hong Kong treated consciousness ascriptions to groups and to 
individuals more similarly then did their U.S. counterparts.  This cultural variance, Huebner et al. 
argue, undermines the epistemic status of (some) intuitions about whether groups can have 
conscious states. 39 
 
embrace a ‘folk dualism’ (Bloom 2004), according to which the mind is radically different than 
the body.
27 It’s plausible that one aspect of such a dualism is the apparent gulf between 
consciousness and physical objects.  For instance, when we think about a brain as a massive 
collection of neurons that has various chemical and physical characteristics, it is not at all 
intuitive that this mass has consciousness.  Something similar can, of course, be said for other 
bodily organs.  Even after we are told that the brain is the part of the body responsible for 
consciousness, this does not render it intuitive that the brain is where conscious experience 
occurs. We suggest that part of the reason for this is that when we consider brains as hunks of 
physical stuff, we are considering descriptions that exclude the sort of cues that tend to activate 
the low-level processes that generate the intuitive sense that an entity is conscious.
28 Hence, it’s 
not surprising if we find some initial resistance to the idea that the physical brain is conscious.
29  
In this light, it’s somewhat ironic that, while people have difficulty thinking of the brain as 
conscious, they have no trouble at all thinking that ants are conscious. On the contrary, our 
experiments indicate that people have trouble thinking that ants are not conscious. 
 
Adam Arico†, Brian Fiala†, Robert F. Goldberg‡, and Shaun Nichols†  
†Department of Philosophy 
                                                 
27 See Chalmers (2002) for a philosophical review of the gulf between consciousness and 
physical objects. 
28 Though, as noted above, there might be other pathways that generate the judgment that an 
entity has conscious states.  
29 For a more detailed treatment of dualist intuitions, especially ‘explanatory gap’ intuitions, see 
Fiala et al. (in press). 40 
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